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HEBER J. HEINER, City Treasurer of said City; and J. C. LITTLEFIELD, City Recorder of said City,
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Defendants.

PETITION FOR REHEARING
The defendants in this proceeding, respectfully but
earnestly petition this Court for a rehearing in this case
in order that the Court may more fully consider and
determine some of the more important questions in this
cause, and particularly the questions relative to limitations on the so-called "special fund doctrine," particularly in the light of new authority here just called to
the Court's attention.
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Counsel for the defendants appreciate that this
Court has given considerable thought to the case. But
it is belived, from a study of the decision, that the Court
has not fully apprehended the relation of the conclusions it reaches to existing law set forth in its own decisions, and those from other jurisdictions, and that a
further consideration of the cases, including those
cited by the Court as the foundation of its own opinion,
and some new authority now cited might result in the
Court reaching another and different conclusion.
The Court also, counsel believes, is under some
misapprehension as to the facts in the matter, as set
forth by the petition and admitted by the demurrer,
and we believe that clearer understanding thereof might
affect the result.

RESUME OF OPINION
The Court recites at some length the pleaded facts,
and it will not be necessary to weary the Court with
any lengthy resume of the situation in that respect.
Briefly stated the facts are simply:
1.

That Ogden City is now indebted to such an

extent that the proposed bond obligations would exceed ihe constitutional debt limit if thry involve an
indebtedness in the meaning that word bears under the
provisions of the Constitution of Utah.

.,

"
.2.

That an imnwdiate and pressing need exists

for the making of certain repairs, improvements and
extensions to the walerworks system of Ogden, a system now in operation and already bonded, earning income sufl1cicnt to pay all the expense of its operation
and maintenance, and to meet all payments of principal and inte:c·st on boLh the outstanJing and the proposed bonded indebledness as the same would fall due
GVer the entire period of the proposed new loan.
3.

That to make such a loan, the city proposes

w retain in its waterworks fund all revenues thereof
reqmsne for th(· purpose of meeting such new bond
obligation payments, and that the effect thereof will

be to discontinue the practice heretofore in force of
transferring surplus, over expense of operation and
ordinary betterments, and

paymt~ilL

<~n·j

bon(!c;~

interest on the· pre:;ent

city has paid, to the

~<eneral

of such principal

indebtedness as the

fur:ds [or use on matters

v.·holly divorced from waterworks improvements.
4.

That it also proposes to pay into that water-

works iund Lhe reasonable value of the water used by
O;;dcn Cit_y for public purposes.

FACTS OVERLOOKED
~ facts appear here which the Court, it appears

lu counsel have entirely overlooked, or misapprehend-

ed. One is that lhtre is an urgent necessiry for the mak-
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ing of these improvements. The Court is bound to so
hold, in the absence of any allegation in the petition
controverting the ordinance in that respect.
We submit that in matters of a legislative character, such as passage of an ordinance, the finding by the
legislative body of the existence of an emergency, or
a necessity for the cloing of anything, ordinarily is binding on the Courts. It may not substitute its-judgmenffor
that of the legislative body in that regard in the absence
of clear proof of any ground upon which such a finding
may be based. Here, the pleading failing totally to
allege any fact impeaching the finding of the City Commission, as set forth in the ordinance, that there is "an
immediate and pressing need" for raising funds to make
these improvements, the Court is bound by that statement of the facts.
Kenyon Hotel Co. vs. 0. S. L. RR. Co. 62
Utah 364, 2 20 Pac. 382 33 A. L. R. 343.
Ogden City vs. Leo 54 l'"tah 556, 182 Pac.
530, 5 A. L. R. 960.
The
other fact
which appears from the pleadings
'
_.,..
is that the _Teo~ of the waterworks is amply sufficier:t
to care for the obligations on the entire funded indebtedness so far as the same falls due during that period.
T[la: tLe Court k:s fo::-med a mistaken view on this

point appears from the language of the court, on the
:;::cond

pa[~e

of its typed decision:

"The estimate does not therefor include all
the City's obligations on its bonds during the 15
year period mentioned."
Please note that the Court here assumes a fact
neither pleaded nor necessarily implied from the pleading. The pleading distinctly recites that "the principal
falling due" on the present bonded indebtedness for
waterworks of Ogden City during the 15 year period
in which the new loans are retireable is $3 75 ,000.00.
The Court's assumption is based upon the theory that
these bonds are all serial bonds running over a 40 year
period. It overlooks the fact that prior to 19 21, the
statute (Compiled Laws 1917, Sec. 794) contemplated
issuance of twenty year term bonds; that in 1921 this
was changed to permit issuance of either term or serial
bonds, having a maturity date of forty years, and that
it is the record thus clearly disclosed, that Ogden City's
bonds are not all serial in character, and that their
terms are such that the non-serial bonds fall due in
large part well after the fifteen year period expires.
It is the fact as pleaded that the $3 75,000 of bonds

falling due in the 15 year period is the whole of the
principal on such bonds due in such period.

APPLICATION OF LAW TO FACTS
Summarized, the decision of this Court now written, upon the matter of the application of the special
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fund doctrine to the admitted facts, and upon allied
points of law, may be summarized as follows:
1.

The case of Barnes v. Lehi City is affirmed

and declared to be still the law of this jurisdiction. That
is, a city may pledge the revenue from a plant, consistin~~

of property it owns, and property it acquires, to

cover the cost of purchasing the acquired property,
without incurring a prohibited indebtedness.
2.

property it owns is income
-But to the
.
acquirement of the new property, the
e.~-

if

~-uci_~&:_prior

income from the property formerly owned may not be
pledged to pay the new obligation, and if the income
comes from such scources or the new acquirements are
of such character that the income from the old and the
r.cw may not be segregated, then the attemet to pledge_
--·~·"""'

the income, or any of the income from the combined
old and new parts of the plant is
not permissable, and a
-..__-,__.-debt is created. For three reasons:
A.

The city may not repudiate the obligation

and let the seller retake his property, but in lieu thereof
the City may be compelled to levy reasonable rates
for water, to place them in the fund, and to pay from
the: fund on the new bond issues. Future City Commissions n:ay not be thus coerced.
B.

The revenues to be impounded in the fund

are revenues of which the City now is the owner, and

·--·..
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which but for the new obligation would be available
to meet other obligations of the City.
C.

Revenues from taxation must be indirectly

used to "feed the spe<:Jitl,ll!.nd:_:...that is the waterworks
........

I

/

/

/

~

.....--

fund.
(NOTE:- Lu the above counsel assumes that
this Court will stand on the latter part of its opinion

\

where it holds that the contractual provision, requiring
raising of rates for water to a point sufficient to meet
I

the obligations of the waterworks iunds, is unconsti-

/

tutional, and that the City, under the Constitution,

i

can and must charge only such rates as are "reasonable." If that be the case, the argument advanced in
the opinion of the Court on page 9 thereof, so far as
it assumes the bondholder to have power to require
raising of the rates,

irresp~ctive

of their

b~ing

reason-

able, is obviously not tenable.)
If we correctly interpret the rulings of the Court,
we desire to respectfully submit that the new decision

upon the law of this subject finds little or no support
in the decided cases, and substantially none in the
wses which the Court cites in its opinion as relevant
thereto. An analysis of these cases and of the opinion
herein easily establishes this point, counsel believes.
ANALYSIS OF CASES CITED
The Court first affirms its opinion in the case of
Barnes vs. Lehi City-74 Utah 321, 279 Pac. 878.
~-----···-~·~--·~
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This is a case where a city, owning a waterworks plant,
used solely for the supply to the city of its own lighting requirements, contracts an obligation for more machinery under the standard Fairbanks, Morse & Co.
contract, with the intent of supplying electrical current
to the public, and pledges the revenue from the sale
of current to the public, as well as moneys to be paid by

it into the special fund -it c~es,-=~~~h moneys to be
··-·

·<---~--·,.._.

.................-............--,....,_-~....................... _. .... .

paid by it covering the reasonable charge for the current used by the city-to the payment of the cost of
such machinery. The seller retained title to the machinery until the same was paid for, and it may be assumed
had the usual right of a conditional vendor to retake
the property on default by the buyer-at least this
Court so assumes in the present opinion although no
such statement appears in the facts given in the case
itself. The installments due on the purchase price are
evidenced by ''pledge orders", instruments signed by
the City, evidences of debt if this be a "debt" in the
constitutional sense, as much as are the proposed bonds
of Ogden City. There is nothing in the reported case,
and we venture to assert nothing in these "pledge
orders" which indicates that these are not enforcible
obliga~ions

except the :imitations which require the

l:o!der to look to their payment from the "special fund"
crcuted from the revenue from the waterworks system,
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and moneys to be paid by the city for the current it
uses.
Please also note that in the current opinion this
Court affirms the Lehi City case so far as it holds that
the requirement for payment for the city's use of current does not change the character of the obligation and
create a constitutional municipal "indebtedness."
We desire the Court to consider the implications of
this case in the light of the current opinion, and of the
other decided cases.
First: If .Barnes vs. Lehi City be a correct statement of law, (which we do not wish to be understood
as disputing) then the following parts of the Court's
opinion in this case clearly are erroneous:
"As already indicated, the contract approved
by this Court in Barnes vs. Lehi City was such a
contract as could be abandoned at any future time
by the governing authorities of the city and the
city would lose nothing of its owned property
or income and would be under no obligation to
make further payment. The Contractor would,
under the express terms of the contract, take back
its own property and retain the paid installments,
which would represent merely the earnings from
the contractor's property. No such results follow
here. There is no way left open for subsequent
Boards of City Commissioners to refuse to be
bound by the debt obligation imposed by the
bonds. The improvements and betterments are

'
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so built into the existing system that they could
not be segregated. On the other hand the ordinance expressly provides that its terms and obligations may be enforced by appropriate action in
lavv or in equity. The City is bound to pay the
interest on or principal of the bonds and may by
court action be coerced to raise or maintain the
wa:er rates suffiCiently to meet such obligations,
and to continue to divert revenues now owned by
it, resulting from the operation of its waterworks system, into the special fund to pay the
water revenue bonds and interest. This is a liability voluntarily incurred by the city by express
contract, and which it is bound to pay in money,
and therefor a 'debt'. Overall vs. City of Madisonville, 125 Ky. 684, 102 S. \V. 278, 12 L. R. A.
(N. S.) 433; 17 C.]. 1376."
It is . ~l!~~':()US in the following:

1:

It assumes .th~.Uhe. only remedy of the seller

---

--·····--~-··'

is re<;.:lP(i.QJl...<lL!li§.,l?L?P.erty. No such fact is stated in
the opinion in Barnes vs. Lehi City. The writer has
not examined the contract to determine if therein the
seller expressly waived any remedy save recaption, but
that fact, if it is a fact, clearly was not deemed of sufficient importance to be even noted in the Court's opinion in that case. And under Fairbanks, Morse & Company contracts, substantially similar to the Lehi contract, referred to in cases which this Court cites in its
opinion, it is made clear that the seller does have another remedy,

~hat

he docs have a power of "coercion"
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and that such fact alone does not constitute the obligation an indebtedness.
Bell vs. City of Fayette 325 Mo. 75, 28 S. W.
( 2nd)3=-=5~7. - - - - - This latter case expressly holds that under such
contracts the seller either may retake his property, but
may proceed by mandamus to enforce, (or coerce) the
city to comply with its contract, maintain the special
fund and pay the "pledge orders" issued under the contract therefrom. And it expressly holds that this does
not create an indebtedness since the action is not on
debt but to enforce a contractual right, i.e. the right
to have the fund maintained and applied as agreed.
"So ::Vlandamus lies to compel payment oi a
claim a~ainst a srecial fun~i "hich is in existence
and in the hands of the proper officer." 38 C. ].
769, and note No. 50 thereunder.
And there can be no question that mandamus will
lie to compel the deposit of public funds in accordance
with law. (38 C. ]. 759)
In fact, as it clearly pointed out in decided cases,
in Barnes vs. Lehi City a stronger objection to the rule
of the special fund is to be found than in the Ogden
case since there the obligee has his remedy, not only
in mandamus, or other appropriate remedy to enforce

t
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the contractual obligation, but has the additional remedy of taking from the city property in which it has
acquired a valuable equity, where in practical effect
new ground of coercion arises. We submit, in all fairness, that this coercion will apply as much to Lehi City,
and will as likely tend to induce its officers to expend
moneys from the general fund if requisite to retain
their investment in the purchased machinery, as it
would so operate had the moneys all be paid from the
general fund.
The Court seems to intimate that there is something new, something contrary to the spirit of our institutions, in a legislative body, such as a city commission binding the corporate bocty it represents in such
manner that the future commissioners may not be able
to

esc~pe

from that action. \Ve cannot conceive that

this court so intends to hold. Nor that it intends to
hold that any contract involving future action by the
city, creates an "indebtedness." If city commissioners
may not bind their succesors in matters dealing with
the city's affairs, then contracts such as Salt Lake City
makes for furnishing water to residents in the county
in exchange agreements are void. All bond issues of
any kind, howsoever authorized, become nullities. Long
term leases of property for public use may not be made.
No "special fund" cases have been rightly decided,
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since even m those cases, which we understand the
court still to approve, such as
\Vinston vs. Spokane 41 Pac. S88:
Shields vs. Loveland 74 Colo. 27. 218 Pac.

913;

\

Shelton vs. City of Los Angeles 206 Cal. 544,
\

275 P. 421.

municipal corporations are bound by acts of present
governing bodies as to their present acts.
Particularly may we call attention to the last sentence of this quoted language, and to the authority upon
which the Court therein seems to hold that any "liability
voluntarily incurred by the city by express contract,
and which it is bound to pay in money" is a "debt".
The case of Overall vs. Madisonville there cited,
which uses the quoted language does so apparently not
with the intent of reaching an absolute definition of
the term nor in any careful analysis of the phrase. The
definition is given, more or less, in an "aside". The
questions involved did not require further definition.
The definition from Corpus Juris is the general
definition found under that phrase. There can be no
(lUarrel with it as a genrral definition. But this Court
has already adopted in Barnes vs. Lehi City, a much
more restricted definition of this term ''debt", holding
that the word takes a meaning much less broad and
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comprehensive than it bears in general usage. Nay, as
we have pointed out, under the Lehi City Contract,
that city assumed an obligation, payable in money, by
express contract, and may be bound to its payment, so
far as the special fund will admit.
The definition most often followed is that contained in Bell vs. City of Fayette, heretofore referred
to:
"The constitutional limitation on the debt
which a municipality may incur contemplates a
debt which must be raid b:,· a resort to taxation."
To adopt the definition given by the Court, is to
hold that in no case where "special fund bonds" have
been isst:ed, in payment for an entirely new system,
all revenue of which is ascribed to the purchase, can
anythi~g

arise other than by "debt" so that the "special

. i,
'

fund doctrine" in all its branches, must willy nilly be
repudiated by the Court.

'

u}·~.
,.-;'

\Ve do not apprehend that the Court so intends.
S'J'ATE VS. CITY OF PORTAGE 174 Wis. 588,
184 N. W. 376.
This case is cited by the Court following its argumen·~

that if the special fund be made up of revenues

from property owned by a city, a new obligation, altho
limited to payment from such fund, is a debt. The Court

(~ (

1

'

.

.

lfi

cites certain language therein which very aptly would
apply to that ruling, if the Court correctly construes
this case. But we beg leave to call to the attention of
the Court the context in which this language is used.
In the Portage case, the statute required Wisconsin
cities, upon order of the state Railroad Commission,
to make purchase of or improvements to waterworks
systems, and to give mortgages, in the nature of purchase money mortgages, upon the system as security
for the purchase price. The Court first considers its
own former decisions, involving cases where purchase
of park lands, the purchase moneys being solely secured by a lien thereon, and not being corporate obligations, were held not void as creating indebtedness,
and then referred to the case of Burnham vs. Milwaukee, 98 Wis. 128, 73 N. W. 1019, where the city
acquired property upon which there existed a mortgage, which the city must pay "to hold and protect
the interest acquired in it," in which case the Wisconsin Court held that the mortgage obligation became
a city "indebtedness", because by non-payment thereof
the city would lose property in which it had invested
general fund moneys. Under these circumstances, the
court held there was coer:!on 1 and that that was a dis....

--~.- _.....__~-·~·

·---

tinguishable factor, using here cited language:
The decision in the Portage case itself is
based solely upon the ground that compliance with
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the order of the Railroad Commission "would
result in m<2.rtgagjug the city's existing waterworks-to s;cure the payment of a corporate debt
incurred after the works were acquired by the
City."
This case is authority for no more than the rule
that a city may not pledge property, (not revenue) it
then holds to

p~ymt;""rrt;;{~~bli~ation, and still claim

the obligation not to be a debt because "payable from
a special funds."

\

DISTINCTION BETWEEN REVENUE AND
PROPERTY
That there is a distinction between the action of
a city in pledging revenue, and in mortgaging its currently owned property to payment of an obligation is
clearly held:
"We have no difficulty in reaching the conclusion that the bonds which it is proposed to
issue are not debts within the meaning of the Constitution, if they are to be paid out of the income
and revenue derived from the operation of the
waterworks plant. If the waterworks system could
be taken to discharge the debts, then the bonds
would create a prohibited, indebtedness."
Bowlin!j Green vs. Kirby (Ky) 295 S. W. 1004.
Also Ward vs. Chicago (infra)
Please note that the Bowling Green case is almost
squarely on all fours with the Ogden case. There the
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city had a $600,000 plant in operation. It was inadequate, and extensions were planned costing $309,00000. If this new obligation constituted "indebtedness"
it exceeded the constitutional limitations. The City set
up from its waterworks revenues 45 'fo to care for operation and maintenance, 10% for depreciation, and 45 'lo
for payment of the new bond issue. (Please nole that
the water works revenues required for Ogden City to
make payment of its proposed bond issue will be less
than 4516 of its net revenue after payment of all operating expense.)

'i'he waterworks revenue had prev.... q.~ ... ••

----~-~-...

,.,.

iousiy gone tq...$t.J.£UJ1..fwuls. The Court had under con-

sideration substantially all the cases cited in the Ogden
Case, except Garret vs. Swanton, including the Illinois
cases, but held that the pledging of the waterworks receipts for construction of waterworks, and "their transfer from the general to a special (und does not create a
new inJebtPdness within the meaning of the Constitution.'' It then defines ''debt" in the Constitutional
sense, as follows:
''If the bonds are issued, they are not the
obligations of the municipality as a corporate
entity. No tax can be levied to pay either the
bonds or the interest thereon. The ordinance carefully provides that the bonds and interest must
be paid out of the income from the operation of
the waterworks plant. If the debt cannot be discharged in that manner, then it cannot be dis-
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charged at all so far as the municipality is concerned. There is no power to impose a tax on the
property within the city to discharge the obligations. If a city cannot be compelled to pay the
debt, it is not an indebtedness falling within the
provisions of either Section 157 or Section 158
of the Constitution."
CASES CITED ON "DEBT"
This Court cites numerous cases at the bottom of
page 9 of its decision, in support of the view that the
Ogden City facts arc such as to make the proposed
bond issue a "debt." \Ve will pass argument on Garret vs. Swanton for the time, as it deserves special
treatment, but taking tl:e rest in order:
Hesse vs. City of Watertown 57 S. D. 325, 232
X. W. 53.
This case is decided wholly on a question of statutory, not constitutional, objection. The statutes in question require, among other things, that the bonds issued
be negotiable. The case refers to Bowling Green vs.
Kirby, and expressly distinguishes that case by pointing out that the bonds were there issued were not
attacked for want of statutory authority, but that the
constitutional question only was involved in the Kirby
case.
It will be kept in mind that this Court has held

that there is no need of statutory authority for the
issuance of the present bonds.

2 rZ

l~l

Hight v. Harrisonville 328 Mo. 549, 41 S. W.
(2nd) 155.
This was another Fairbanks, Morse & Co. case.
Here under substantially an identical contract with
that found in the Lehi case the question involved was
solely whether or not the requirement, that the city
must pay into the special fund charges for the current
it itself used, invalidated the contract. The court says:
·'Ohlig~l~ion:;

dio;c1};_:r:l;:::<ible solely out oi a
ftmd to the ;'aymc::1t of which lhe general
credit uf the mur:icipality is not pledged are nevcrth~lcss debt~: o; ~he city fo · L~:c purpose of t~·.c
COUSLitutiGJal I;mit<.,:i:ms :' t: l~ fund is the product of taxation .. ,
~:pccial

·-·--.-~

-- --."

...

...

We do not a:c;sume that this Court in citing this
ca~e

has any intention of overruling its decision in

both the Lehi case and the Ogden case that the pay·
ment for the city's use of light or water docs not make
the obligation a deLlt. So we assume no further ;lttention need be paid this case.
Campbell v. Arkansas-Missouri Power Co. 55 F. (2nd)
155.
\Ve concede that this is authority against the
position taken by Ogden City in this proceeding. BUT
it is only such authority if this Court is willing to re-

\

\
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verse itself, and concede Barnes v. Lehi City to be bad
law.
In the City of Campbell case, that City in February, 1930, held a bond election to authorize expenditure of public moneys on erection of a power house,
etc., for a lighting system. Less than two months later,
on April 5th, 1930, it entered into a typical Fairbanks,
Morse & Co. contract for machinery with which to
equip that power house. This machinery, it is apparent
on examination of the opinion, was an entegral part of
the p!ant, requisite before any revenue could come
from the plant. The Court says:
"The defendant, Fairbanks, Morse & Co.,
made delivery of the machinery covered by the
contract which was installed in the power house,
on the foundations constructed by the city, and
the plant was put in operation by the city in November, 1930."
This Court went far past this decision in the Lehi
case. The City of Campbell only furnished a power
house and foundations for use as a shelter and bed for
the machinery if purchased. Lehi City furnished not
o~ly

the power house and the foundations but also the

existing distributing system as well. Yet this court sust.ai;1c d the power of tl:is City to make that contract.
We find no indications in the opinion before us that
this court is any more disposed to follow the Camp-
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bell case than it is to follow the Harrisonville case.
Zachary v. City of Wagoner 146 Okla. 268, 292
P. 345.
Another case which would justify overruling
Barnes v. Lehi City, but which means nothing so long
as that case remains settled law in this jurisdiction. It
goes further, even, than the other cases, holding that a
purchase of new electric light plant equipment, to be
paid for solely from the savings in cost of operation to
be effected through its installation, was prohibited.
The Court repudiates the whole "special fund doctrine"
so far as Oklahoma is concerned:
"\Ve are not unmindful of the rule followed
in some jurisdictions that the purchase of property does not create an indebtedness if the purchase price is to be paid out of the income therefrom (citing cases) but we cannot follow such
holding."
Even the limitations made bv 1he C,.,,,.. i,-.

+J,,..

current opinion go beyond this case, where clearly the
payments came from income which the city would not
have had in the absence of the new equipment.
Miller v. City of Buhl. 48 Ida. 668, 284 P. 843.

-----·---..--

This case also repudiates the "special fund" doc-

trine in tot,. It is decided wholly on the authority of
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Feil v. Cour D'Alene, (129 Pac. 643,42 L. R. A. (NS)
1095) in which the Idaho Supreme Court held that
under the Idaho Constitution, containing the word
"liability" as well as the word "indebtedness" in the
i '

limitation sections relating to cities, the former word
had a wider meaning than the latter, and that the cases

.'.!./'

upholding the special fund doctrine had no application

'!

,,.. .../~

·'· '

I

m Idaho.
Fox v. Bicknell 193 Ind. 537, 141 N. E. 222.
In this case, the Indiana Supreme Court expressly
upheld the special fund doctrine, the case involving
solely the creation of a fund from the income of an
entire plant purchased, to retire the bonds issued to
cover the purchase price. In the opinion it points out
that general taxes cannot be levied to pay the debts,
that there is no pledging or mortgaging of property
it already owned, no pledging of income it was entitled
to receive, etc., but does this solely in distinguishing
the case from other cases, including Schnell v. Rock
Island, ( 232 Ill. 89, 83 N. E. 462, 14 L. R. A. (NS)
8 74) now no longer law in Illinois on the point in
question. It does not hold that the presence of any of
these factors would change its decision. We submit
that there is here neither any required finding, nor any
intent to hold that the facts presented in the Ogden
ca,;e would involve a "debt."

r'
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It is interesting to note that Garret vs. Swanton
relies almost wholly for its authority upon City of
Campbell

v.

Arkansas-Missouri

Power

Company

(supra.) It finds no other support, and cites no other
case except Schnell v. City of Rock Island (supra).
·while numerous citations of cases are given in the
quoted portion of the Campbell and Rock Island cases,
none of those cases are themselves assigned as authority, and the Court will note from the previous part of
this brief that most of them are not in any wise applicable in a state which recognizes the special fund doctrine. Even the language quoted from the Fayette case
had reference to a situation wholly different from that
presented in the California case or here. (See citation
from McQuillin, Munc. Corp. Sect. 2389 with reference
to which that quotation occurs.)
Frankly, the writer thinks that the California
court desired to depart from the special fund doctrine,

i

and having evolved the theory of the danger that the

I

special fund must be fed attempted to support it by

t

~

t'i ; .._. '

authority, even though the authority had to be finely , 'h \ ·
/ ./
strained.

\

{

Of course this does not apply to the citation of
J

the Rock Island case. The Illinois Court concedes that
in Illinois the special fund doctrine has no application.
It says:
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"The argument that no indebtedness is created where the obligation is to pay under some
fixed and definite scheme, from some particular
fund, which is pledged for payment, is sustained
by decisions. of other courts; but after so many
'years'o(]lidicT~f~~il"s{;{~~·tron, extending from the
case of Springfielcl v. Edwards, 84 Ill. 626, to
LDhdcJl v. Chicago, .227 Ill. 208, 81 N. E. 354,
it !s not necessary and we would not enter anew
upon a discussion of the meaning of our Constitution."

/fo :;'

Neither Schnell v. Rock Island, (nor also Joliet
v. Alexander, 194 Ill. 457, 62 N. E. 861) are law even
in Illinois, in view of the decision in Ward vs. Chicago,
hereafter referred to at length.
SLIM MARY OF CASES CRITICIZED
It thus appears that, of the cases which the

Court cites in support of its opinion that the bonds
O:~de:;1

City would issue will constitute a debt, the

Harrisville Case, the: Campbell Case, the Wagoner
case and the Buhl case are not such authority, but are
authority that the Barnes v. Lehi case is wrong. The
\\'atcrtown case would seem to be authority for power !___!_:!~
~o

incur sucl1 an obligation where statutory provisions

do nut p·cvent, since it seems to agree with the Bowling

~en

case, and the case of Fox v. Bicknell is not

decided on the point at issue here. That leaves only
/

{~arret v. Swanton, ~~ml its decision is founded on an

/
:·t·

c'''

···~r-"""'',H''

.,
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even weaker line of citations, for a state which recognizes the "special fund doctrine" at all, than is the
Ogden case; let alone the novel theory of the California court as to feeding of special funds, which in any
case is applicable to a situation the exact opposite of
that before us here, as we will show, later.
Before this Court used the language we have had
under criticism, it referred to the Lehi City case, and
cited as similar cases the Fayette case and
Jones v. City of Corbin, 227 Ky. 674, 13 S. W.
(2nd) 1013.
Yet this Corbin case is far more than authority
for the Lehi City case-we think at least it is squarely
authority for the case now before this court. There the
city authorities created a special fund, and directed
that into it be set apart 15 ;7<; of the revenue of a public
utility it then owned for the purpose of purchasing
new equipment. After some three or four months, income at the rate of $1500 per month from this scource
having created some $7000.00 of funds, it used that
as a down payment on the equipment and pledged the
15% of its gross revenues to the payment of the balance.
It seems aparent from the facts before the Court

m the Ogden case that the amount Ogden City may

have to pay annually on the proposed bond issue will
not so greatly exceed 15 l}'o of its gross revenue as to
materially alter the situation in this case from the Corbin case.

FEEDING OF THE SPECIAL FUND
This Court seems, at least impliedly, to have
adopted the theory on which its opinion is based primarily on the case of Garrett v. Swanton . As noted
above, that attempts to lay down a principle restricting
::1.0plication of the special fund doctrine to cases where
there is no need of "feeding the special fund."
The decision in this case, primarily, rests upon

the theory that the city of Santa Cruz had placed itself in a position where it must "feed the special fund"
from general revenues. There the city had in effect
an ordinance which already obligated the special fund
created in its waterworks department to meet the payments on principal and the interest on its current bonded debt. ( 13 Pac. ( 2) 72 9, col. 2.) It argues that "if the
water fund be depleted by the payments made to Fairbanks, :Morse & Co. for the pumping plant, the fund
created for the payn1ent of interest and principal on tlw
bonds will be depleted," and "since such bonds are a
general obligation of the city. the taxpayers must at all
times be ready to feed the special fund .if the income is
not suff1cient to pay both interest and principal on the

I
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bonds and the payments to Fairbanks, Morse and
Company. It follows, of course, that, when this contract vvas executed, the taxpayers became indirectly
liable to pay the amount thereof."
It seems to us that the material difference between

the ordinances in effect in Santa Cruz and in Ogden
City makes the reasoning of the California Court inapplicable on this point. In both cases, the outstanding
bonds are obligations of the general fund. But in the
Santa Cruz case, the ordinance of that city requires
that the special waterworks fund make payment of
the principal and interest on the bonds; in the Utah
case the ordinance does not so provide, and merely
permits the City Commission to provide for payment

'Lherefrom in its discretion. The Ogden outstanding
bonds are not now, and never have been charges upon
anything except the tax revenues of the city.
\Ve come again to the argument which this Court
dismisses rather hastily and, we think, illadvisedly, in
ti1c opinion under discussion. There is, and the Court

agrees with us, no reason why Ogden City,-as it in
fact now is doing- cannot retain the whole of its
\':aterworks revenue in its special fund, levy taxes and
make payment of its principal and interest on outstanding bonds, and pay into that fund the reasonable
charges for the water it uses itself. No obligation of
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any kind rests upon the city to use any of its waterworks income for any purposes, other than maintenance and minor betterments.
There is then, in the Ogden City case, no question of feeding a special fund from general revenue.
What Ogden City has been doing, perhaps illadvisedly,
i:-; to feed its general funds from special revenues.
Instead of setting up depreciation accounts, and acquiring reserves from which to keep its system in repair,
it has used the money which came in for other municipal purposes.
Meantime its main transmission system, consisting
of two pipe lines, is in dangerous shape. The old pipe
line, after forty-five years of use, lets 20% of the
water supply leak away, not only wasting the water,
but perhaps endangering the city's rights to preserve it,
and certainly placing the city in a position where slides
du~

to leakage may result in damage to private prop-

erty and such actions against the city as have heretofore reached this very Court.
Its great mains, leading from its reservoirs, also
nearly half a century old, leak away another
15

taro

to

ro of all the water supplied to them, causing sinking

oi pavement, a!1d other damage, and depleting the
city's resources, while the pumps at the artesian wells
run at

constan~

expense to bring forth water to make

•
up these losses. Summer water uses draw the present
reservoirs down to such dangerously small reserves
that the fire hazard is extremely high, and the city
has escaped disaster by narrow margins on more than
one occasion.
And with all this, the city fathers have blithely
poured into various other forms of municipal expenditure the revenues of the waterworks system which
should have been used to prevent depreciation and
build up funds with which to make the improvements
needed. Perhaps with good reason at that! For this
court knows that one administration, which seeks to
save funds, must realize that it will be met with defeat at the polls from candidates who would use the
saved funds to lower taxes. The whole political system
is so shaped as to make tbe voluntary accumulation
of a proper r2serve for caring for such a situation as
Ogden City nmv faces impossible, as a practical matter.
These arguments, so far as based on the city's
current situation, are probably not within the pleadings to the extent that they detail facts presently existing. But the Court is bound to know that there is an
urgent public necessity for the doing of the improvements which the bond issue would admit. The Court
mpst realize, indeed knows as a matter of law, that

::o
the City if it cannot borrow as it seeks to do, must
conserve at long last its waterworks revenues, must
probably in view of the urgency existing levy taxation
to the limit of its powers to raise funds to make the
needed improvements.
\V e submit then that any argument based upon the

assumption that the taxes of the city will be in the
least reduced by the failure of the bond issue to carry
is pure theory with no foundation in fact. It seems
novel to counsel that any court, would be entitled to
assume the continued existence of any such state of
facts with regard to handling of the public moneys.
This Court, we think, should rather assume that the
taxpayer's condition will be better if the cost of the
improvements to be made are spread over 15 years
by a bond issue, rather than paid for in four or five
years from increased taxes and complete use of all
waterworks funds for that purpose.
But the Court advises us that there is a difference
between the city retaining its water rates for such use,
as it lawfully may do, as that is expenditure for a lawful
purpose, and use of exactly the same means to pay off
moneys obtained to do the needed work at once, while
materials and labor are cheap, as a unit, saving the

losses inevitable to piecemeal carrying on of such a
project. This the Court tells us, is incurring a "debt".

:n
May counsel respectfully submit to the Court
that it merely argues in a circle when it so declares.
The question before the Court is whether or not there
is a "debt" created. One ground for such a ruling lies
in this "special fund feeding" theory. We point out
that the theory cannot apply, because we do not feed
the special fund, we merely cease to feed the general
fund improvidently with special fund revenue. And
the Court replies that that makes no difference, "debt"
is created. The argument assumes the very fact it is
designed to establish.
AUTHORITY SUPPORTING CITY'S POSITION
The effect of the preceding argument is of course
pointed towards destructive criticism of the court's
viewpoint. The Court may pro;Jerly criticize us unless
we add to this matter of constructive character. This
we haste to do, and we desire to call the court's attention:
First, to new authority, not heretofore cited, or
where cited, not so definitely called to the Court's
attention as to sufficiently aid the Court.
Second, to one new line of reasoning from the
authorities which we think worthy of consideration
as a rule establishing a line of demarcation in the decided opinions.
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Schnell v. Rock Island, and the case on which it
is based. Joliet v. Alexander 1 as we have pointed out,
mark the extreme limits of the rule contra to the Ogden
City position. These cases are cited in almost every
decision which this Court has mentioned in its opinion.
In them can be found the only clear basis for the
opinion in Garrett v. Swanton. We call the Court's
attention to the fact that the Supreme Court of Illinois
has repudiated the doctrine of these cases, at least so
far as the same applies to the identical situation now
before this Court:
Ward v. City of Chicago, 342 Ill. 167, 173 N. E. L-~--~
810.
Chicago owned and operated its waterworks system. The State of Illinois passed a statute which
authorized that city to sell waterworks certificates of
indebtedness to the extent of $12,000,000.00, stating
on their face that they were payable solely from the
revenues of the waterworks sytem, "for the purpose of
paying the cost of improving and extending the waterworks system."
Chicago then passed an ordinance providing for
certain improvements. This ordinance ( 1) created a
special fund into which the revenues of the waterworks
system is to pass; ( 2) provided that from it main ten-

•
ance and operating expense should be paid; ( 3) provided that there should be also paid from it "obligations
of the city heretofore issued that are payable by their
terms from such revenue, whether in the form of certificates, bonds or otherwise," and the certificates issued
under the provisions of the ordinance for the proposed
improvements and repairs.
The question of whether or not such bonds constitute "indebtedness'' under the Constitution of Illinois
is

dire~tly

raised in the case. The Court first calls

attention to its own decision in Maffitt v. City of
Decatur, 322 Ill, 82, 152 N. E. 602, where it had held
valid an obligation to pay a corporation compensation
from water rates for lands flooded by the city in constructing a dam for its waterworks system. The City
of Decatur had exhausted its bonding power under
general law, and could not buy the lands, so it instigated the formation of a corporation to buy the lands,
and make such a contract. After considering the
Decatur case, the Court says:
·· h i:; apparent that tile gcne:al situation in
the present case is similar to that in the Decatur
case, and that the obligation which it is proposed
to crca~c here cannot be said to be, from the standpoint of the City fundarncntally different from
the one which was there involved. There the city
already had a complete water system in operation,
but the addition of new elements was necessary

if it \\'as to be made adequate to meet the city's
growing needs. (As in the case of Ogden City's
new reservoir.) Here the proposed new elements
take a different form but their purpose is the
same.
''There the existing disposition of water
rents was done away with and all moneys received
from the system went into one fund out of which
certain operating expenses were taken. Although
the value of the addition to the plant was no
greater than that of the remainder of the plant
exclusive of the addition, an apparently arbitrary
percentage of nine-tenths of the remainder of this
fund was then alloted to the water company which
financed this addition. Here all re·uenues received
from the water system is to be deposited in a separate fund, out of which are to be paid all maintenance and operating expense, and the remainder
is to be a';;ailablc to pay back those who finance
tJ:r proposed extensions by purchasing the certificates.
"There the amount coming into the water
fund w~1s c!epenrlent upon rates fixed by the city,
a::d the amm:nt in the water fund here will be
determined in the same manner. There compensation for the water company came solely from
the water fund thus created and no obligation to
pay was imposed upon the City. Here no portion
of the plant is pledged for payment and holders of
certificates have no recourse save out of the proposc·d water fund. That the obligation of the city
:1ruse there out of a simple reciprocal contract,
(as in Barnes v. Lehi City) whereas here it would
be represented by rlocuments in the form of negotiable uotes can make no difference so far as

the question at issue is concerned. If no indebtedness within the constitutional limitation was created there, no substantial reason exists for saying
that any would be created here.
"The main reliance of appellant is upon the
case of Joliet v. Alexander-(supra). The City
of Joliet, owning a system of waterworks, had
passed an ordinance providing for extensions
thereto. To pay for these extensions water fund
certificates were issued. These certificates were
secured by a mortgage which covered both the
existing system and the extension constructed under the ordinance. The Court properly held that
an indebtedness within the constitutional prohibition was created. Counsel for the appellant la:v
considerable stress upon certain language of
the opinion to the effect that indebtedness
within such constitutional prohibition ma3•
be __ created .. by .. pledging ... an .. existing. tncome of the city. ,\rguing that in the
present ca~e there can be !1'J wav of determining
how much income would be attributable to the
enlargement of the system when made or how
much would be attributable to the new rates when
put into effect; that the so-called new income
cannot be segregated from the present income;
that the present income will thercbJ be tL!.ken
away and lost; and that so cutting it off and
pledging it will create an indebtedness within the
meaning of the language invoked. (How concise
a statement of the petitioner's position in this
proceeding.)
"The position thus taken seems to be that
pledging the water fund creates indebtedness with-

in the constitutional prohibition unless the pledge
is confined to such precise income as can be
directly traced to the particular new physical
element of the plant to pay for which the obligation secured was issued, leaving the original income intact and usable by the city for other purposes altogether. The Decatur case is decisive
<tgainst the soundness of such a position. There
the income from the original plant was in effect
cut off and lumped into the fund resulting from
the operation of the plant as enlarged. It is not
apparent that any effort was there made to presen'e such original income intact or exempt it in
any manner or degree from the claim of the water
rornpany or that moneys made available to the
water company under the contract were at all
limited to income traceable to the elements of
the plant which it had financed." (Interpolations
and italics are ours.)
Please note: That Schnell v. Rock Island, and
the case of Joliet v. Alexander upon which it bases its
opinion, is the foundation of every case adversely limiting the special fund doctrine where any question of the
use of other property of the city, or income, is based.
The Joliet case is the sole authority for the Schnell
case. The Schnell case in turn, and particularly its
quotations from the Joliet case, is the underpinning
of the whole line of authority adverse to the Ogden
bond issue in any respect.
Counsel for defendants apologizes to the Court for
being so belated in calling its attention to this decisive

•
opinion. His excuse is simply that the Illinois cases
had been so strongly against the position taken by the
city that he had not deemed it worth while to run them
down. The other cases hereafter cited are partly of
recent vintage, and found by inspection of a digest
published since the argument of this cause, in part
cases which now seem in point in the light of the
Court's opinion, but did not seem so formerly, and
some to which we think the Court gave insufficient
weight in the present opinion.

Sowell v. Griffiith (Tex) 294 S. W. 521 ' ·
Bowling Green v. Kirby (supra)
, ..
McCuthcin v. City of Siloam Springs (Ark.) 49~-· : ·:' ' ' •·
S. W. (2nd) 1037
Johnson Y. City of Stuart 1 Ia.) 2?(} N. W. 164
Searle v. City of Hautun (Colo.) 2 71 Pac. 630.
In Sowell v. Griffith, under the city charter a fund
was created to which went all of the waterworks revenues, and from which was paid the cost of operation and
maintenance, and the amounts due and outstanding on
bond issues for the plant. The charter provided that
any surplus could be used for general fund purposes
to reduce taxes. The case represents a close parallel
to the Ogden decision, but is stronger against us in
that when the attacked obligation was sought to be
incurred, the city had previously issued obligations
against the fund. The Texas court find the provisions

:lH
consonant with the constitution m that the proposed
issuance of obligations against this special fund do
not constitute "debt".
McCutchin v. Siloam Springs.
The city built a light plant in 1918, issuing bonds
to provide means for its construction and installation.
When the proposed obligation came up, these bonds
had been paid, and the net revenue belonged to the
city, which owned in addition to the plant 25 miles
of distribution system. and other property used to
produce revenue in the system. It was proposed to
build a new power plant with new equipment on land
belonging to the city, and to pay for the same by impounding the revenue of the entire system, above
cost of maintenance and operations, the improvements
being found to be necessary because the old power
house and plant were obsolete, if not fairly well worn
out. The proposed obligation was attached under a
constitutional provision. (Amendment No. 10) prohibiting incurrence of "indebtedness" in excess of current revenues. which it was admitted would occur if
the obligation represented "indebtedness." The Court
flatly holds that no such indebtedness arises. The case

does not discuss at length the application of revenues
presently held, but points out that the city authorities
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might deem the expenditures necessary to preserve
current revenues.
Johnston v. City of Stuart.
This case stands exactly on all fours with Barnes
v. Lehi City EXCEPT that the Iowa town had a going
plant from which it was in receipt of revenues, a fact (
which is completely without effect on the ultimate decision of the court.
Bowling Green v. Kirby.
This case has been so extensively gone into before
that further comment would seem unnecessary. It
squarely supports our view and is the most cited case
thereon.
Searle v. Hartun.
A situation squarely on all fours with that here
is presented. The Court points out that in every case,
except that of Schnell v. Rock Island, which is decided contra to the right of the city to proceed, a mortgage or pledge of property was in some wise involved.
It says:

"We see, however, no difference in substance
between a promise or pledge of the future income
of property which now has an income, and the
promise or pledge of the future income of property which now has none. If one would make the
sum secured a debt, the other would. In either
case, the income is produced by property already

-W
owned Ly the City, which seems to be the condition condemned by the cases cited by plaintiff on
this point."
Reviewing briefly this part of the argument, may
we again submit that the departure of the Illinois Court,
in its overruling of the Joliet case, seems to us to
weaken if not destroy the effect of all the authority
extant whicl1 in any wise supports the present opinion
of the Court; that the Chicago case, the Arkansas
case,

th~~

Iowa case, the Kentucky case, the Texas

case and the Colorado case comprize highly important additions to the cases supporting the view Ogden
City takes herein. In the light of this authority, largely
fir:-t called to the Court's attention, we feel entitled
to assert that the overwhelming weight of opinion is
adverse

~o

the decision of this Court as now written,

an;J to a::;k that that opinion be re-examined.

Stccond. as to new matter, may we ask the Court to
considtr, as i,.; done is

~;ome

of the cases noted, 'lhe

l'ilect of its decision as to extensive repairs. We may
a~;sume

for this that the Courts such as North Dakota.

which have followed thP former Illinois ruling, would
still

rm~sist

in spite of \1.-ard v. Chicago. But in none

of them is there raised a question of the right to incur

"''c:1

oLlir~aticns

for tl'e purpose of making neces-

sary repairs to the system for the purpose of preserv:.:g the incom·.· it now yif'lds. Clearly if the mains and

•
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the canyon pipe line fail, the City will be without
revenue. In that case, would this Court hesitate to
approve incurring of obligations to repair the mains,
or pipe lines, in order that the revenue might be restored? If not, upon what ground of public policy is
there to be found reason for prohibiting use of the
same means to prevent such failure and to protect and
assure continuation of present revenue. The point is
touched on in one or more of the cases herein cited,
and will not be amplified. but we call to the Court's
attention that even in the North Dakota case of Wilder
v. Murphy, (218 N. W. 156) where the use of income
of existing dormitories, where pledged to pay for construction of entirely new and separate structures is
forbidden on the authority of Schnell v. Rock Island,
no question of repairs to existing dormitories, required
to preserve their income yield was involved. And that
in Lang v. Cavalier, 288 N. W. 825, recently decided,
the North Dakota court departs materially from its
position in the Wilder case.
In closing, we direct the Court's attention again
to the fact that in Barnes v. Lehi City this court has
approved the u.se- of f roperty, already owned by the
city, in earning revenue to be applied towards payment of a new obligation. We further call attention to
the fact that this was revenue producing property, in
that it saved to Lehi City the cost of purchasing cur-
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rent and distribution thereof from private interests.
We call attention to the fact that this present revenue,
this saving, was lost to the taxpayers under the court's
then decision, since it affirmed the right of the city
to make payment therefor from general taxes into the
special fund to be used to pay the new obligation. And
consistently with that opinion,

\Ve

again ask the Court

to reconsider the present decision which seems to us
utterly inconsistent with affirmation of the Barnes
case.
We submit:
That the decided cases do not support the opinion
of the Court upon the point in question; that in view
of the holding by the court that any rates must be
re::1sonable, (and clearly to be reasonable they must
neither be too high nor too low) there can be no uniawful coercion exercised upon future city authorities;
a:-~d

that the bond issues should be sustained, and re-

;,caring granted.

STUART P. DOBBS,
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